When a firm is able to recognize its previous customers, it may use information about their purchase histories to price discriminate. We analyze a model with a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers are able to maintain their anonymity and avoid being identified as past customers, possibly at an (exogenous) cost.
Introduction
Perhaps the most important factor contributing to concerns about personal privacy is the potential for discrimination. In an effort to avoid differential treatment, individuals are typically reluctant to disclose sensitive personal information such as income, family status, ethnicity, race, or lifestyle. In recent years, revolutionary developments in information technology regarding collection, storage, and retrieval of personal data have brought privacy to the forefront of public awareness and debate. This paper addresses a key component of the emergent concerns regarding electronic privacy, namely, the ability of firms to track individual purchasing patterns and to use this information to practice behavior-based price discrimination (Armstrong, 2006; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2006) .
Records containing the sequence of web sites visited and the online purchases made by individuals provide valuable clues about their personal information, clues that can be used to target tailor-made offers to them (Chen, 2006; Wathieu, 2006; Pancras and Sudhir, 2007; Chen and Zhang, 2008) . Such behavior-based advertising and price discrimination are already ubiquitous in electronic commerce (Odlyzko, 2003; Hann et al., 2007) . Nevertheless, the economic impact of these practices is not fully understood. Presently, privacy practices in electronic commerce are dictated largely by voluntary compliance with industry standards, recommendations by regulatory agencies, and consumer concerns (FTC, 2007) .
Although technology has allowed sellers to store and process consumers' online activities with relative ease, consumers do have some control over allowing sellers to record their individual activities. For instance, they can exert effort to understand sellers' privacy disclosures and take actions to circumvent being tracked. Such actions can include erasing or blocking browser cookies, using a temporary email address, paying with a different credit card, making payments using a gift card acquired for cash in a brick-and-mortar store, and renting a postal box. Examples of sellers discriminating based on past purchases include Comcast and Time Warner offering discounted packages that can be obtained only once per name and address, AOL offering special "new customer" accounts that can be opened only by revealing credit card numbers that have not been applied before to a similar offer, and credit report services offering once a year promotions tied to a consumer's social security number. Perhaps the most notorious example is the price discrimination fiasco of 2000 in which Amazon charged past customers higher prices for DVDs that their purchase histories suggested they would be likely to want. 1 The key to these examples is that sellers have difficulty committing to future prices and committing not to use information about past purchases.
The current set of guiding standards and recommendations (FTC, 2007 ) takes into account a large variety of concerns, but appears to have little basis in formal economic theory or empirical evidence. This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the economic impacts of privacy regulation, focusing specifically on consumer profiling and behavior-based price discrimination. We study a monopolist who is able to track (strategic) consumers' purchases from the firm. Consumers, however, are able to avoid being identified as past customers (or to "opt 1 See, for instance, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/. It is worth noting that Amazon still price discriminates by, for example, offering past customers targeted coupons. However, to our knowledge, it no longer shows (in a direct manner) different prices to different consumers based on their past purchases.
out"), possibly at a cost. We note that in our framework, a firm is likely to charge past customers more than "new customers" because their past purchases signal a higher willingness to pay (for tractability purposes we abstract from settings where the seller may want to give discounts to past customers, for instance, due to diminishing marginal utility). We find that when consumers can costlessly opt out (and by doing so, maintain their anonymity), they all individually choose to do so, which results in the highest profit for the seller. We show that increasing the cost of obtaining anonymity can benefit consumers, but only up to a point; at that point, the effect is reversed.
The intuition for this paradoxical finding is closely related to the celebrated Coase Conjecture (Coase, 1972) and runs as follows. When the cost of maintaining anonymity is high, the seller is better able to recognize past customers and to price discriminate against them.
Thus, consumers hesitate to make an initial purchase, knowing this will cause them to pay a premium on future purchases. Anticipating this reluctance by consumers, the seller is forced to offer a lower initial price, and this effect actually dominates the increase in profits arising from price discrimination in future periods. In other words, the seller would prefer to commit itself not to price discriminate based on prior purchases. When the cost of maintaining anonymity is low, consumers -in effect -give the seller this commitment power when they each rationally choose to keep their purchases private. This paper is also related to work in the literatures on intertemporal price discrimination, consumer recognition, and online privacy. Research on intertemporal price discrimination and the "ratchet" effect, where the firm sets higher prices for consumers who signaled higher willingness to pay, dates back to the late 1970's. Stokey (1979) and Salant (1989) show that intertemporal price discrimination is never optimal for a monopolist who can commit to future prices. This is analogous to the fact, mentioned above, that in our model, the monopolist obtains its highest profit when anonymity is costless. Villas-Boas (2004) shows that committing to future prices can also help in a model with overlapping generations of consumers.
A relatively small literature on consumer recognition and online privacy has begun to develop over the past several years. 2 Early contributions by Chen (1997) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) , Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , Villas-Boas (1999) , Shaffer and Zhang (2000) , Taylor (2003) , Chen and Zhang (2008) , and Chen and Zhang (2009) introduced the notion of consumer recognition and personalized pricing into economic theory, but did not explicitly consider privacy issues in online environments. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) explore what happens when the ability to identify consumers varies across goods. They consider a model in which con-sumers can be anonymous or "semi-anonymous," depending on the good bought. Villas-Boas (1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) analyze a duopoly model in which consumers have a choice between remaining loyal to a firm and defecting to the competitor, a phenomenon they refer to as "consumer poaching." Chen and Zhang (2008) analyze a "price for information" strategy, where firms price less aggressively in order to learn more about their customers. Chen and Zhang (2009) find that price competition can be mitigated by firms vying to distinguish their loyal customers from price sensitive shoppers.
Closest to our work is an emerging literature on optimal online privacy policies. These were first studied by Taylor (2004) , Acquisti and Varian (2005) , and Calzolari and Pavan (2006) . Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) and Esteves (2010) offer surveys of this literature. Taylor (2004) and Villas-Boas (2004) show how strategic consumers could make a firm worse off in the context of dynamic targeted pricing. Once consumers anticipate future prices, they may choose to forgo a purchase today to avoid being identified as a past customer and thus be able to purchase at a lower price targeted at new consumers. This strategic "waiting" on the part of consumers can hurt a firm both through reducing sales and diminishing the benefit of price discrimination. Acquisti and Varian (2005) show that it is never profitable for a monopolist to condition its pricing on purchase history, unless a sufficient proportion of consumers are not sophisticated enough to anticipate the firm's pricing strategy or the firm can provide enhanced services to increase consumer valuation in subsequent purchases. Acquisti and Varian (2005) also begin to study consumers' use of anonymizing technologies (so as to circumvent identification by a firm as a past customer) but do not fully study the welfare implications. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) show that in a game with two sellers selling one after the other, where buyers may have correlated valuations for their products, information trade between the first seller and the second seller will occur under some conditions and the effects of such information trade on welfare vary.
These papers provide important insights regarding the fundamental economic tensions between consumer privacy and price discrimination. This paper considers a richer environment, in which a firm's strategic customers can choose to remain anonymous at some cost. We study how this cost affects equilibrium behavior and welfare. Our model allows us to gain additional insights into the effects of tightening privacy regulation. In particular, we show that (putting aside considerations about the intrinsic value of privacy and other non-price related privacy concerns) while the firm obtains its highest profit when consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity, consumers can, under some circumstances, be better off when maintaining anonymity is costly, but only up to a point. Beyond that point, facilitating opting out (or increasing privacy) benefits consumers and increases overall welfare. This result is in contrast to the prior literature because it actually agrees with the common intuition that more privacy can be better (even when consumers are strategic). Even more surprising is that this welfare behavior happens in a region of opting-out costs where no consumer chooses to opt out. In other words, we find that added privacy can benefit consumers and increase overall surplus, even when no consumer decides to take advantage of it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 gives two benchmarks: when there is no customer recognition, and when there is no opting out. The equilibrium of the game with opting out is derived in Section 4 along with comparative statics, and Section 5 concludes. Proofs that are not in the main body of the paper are relegated to an appendix.
2 The model
The consumers
There is a continuum of consumers with total mass normalized to one. All consumers are riskneutral, possess a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1], and maximize their present expected utilities. Each consumer demands at most one unit of a non-durable, indivisible good in each of two periods. Consumer i's valuation for the good is the same in each period and is determined by the realization of a random variable v i with support normalized to be the unit interval.
Consumer valuations are independently and identically distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F (v) with density f (v), which is strictly positive on (0, 1). Consumer i's valuation v i is initially private information.
The firm
There is a monopolist that produces and sells the good in each period. The firm's production cost is normalized to zero, it possesses the same discount factor δ as consumers, and it maximizes its discounted expected profit. It does not observe consumer valuations directly but maintains a database containing purchasing histories. Each consumer is either anonymous or identifiable. If a consumer is anonymous, then there is no record of any prior purchases by her; i.e., she is not in the database. If she is identifiable, then in the second period the firm knows the purchasing decision that she made in the first period. We emphasize that the firm has no commitment power, i.e., the firm is unable to set and commit to second-period prices in the first period. Because there is a continuum of consumers, each of them realizes that her first-period purchasing decision alone does not affect the prices charged by the firm in the next period. 3
The game
All aspects of the environment, including the distribution of valuations F (v), are common knowledge. At the beginning of the game all consumers are anonymous. Hence, the firm offers the same first-period price p 1 to all of them. Next, each consumer decides whether to buy the good in the first period, q i 1 = 1, or not to buy it, q i 1 = 0. Consumers who elect to buy the good also decide whether to let the firm keep a record of the transaction (r i = 1) or to opt out and maintain anonymity by deleting the record of the sale (r i = 0). The cost to any consumer who opts out is c ≥ 0, 4 and we without loss of generality assume that this cost is expended in the second period (i.e., it is discounted by δ). This cost represents the time, effort, and any monetary expense of maintaining anonymity. We also allow consumers who purchase to randomize between opting out and not opting out. A consumer who does not purchase the good continues to be anonymous and is thus pooled with the buyers who opted out, from the firm's perspective. At the beginning of period two, the firm posts a price p 0 2 to the unidentified (anonymous) consumers and a price p 1 2 to the identified ones. 5 Consumers can buy the good only at the price offered to them, q i 2 ∈ {0, 1}; i.e., no arbitrage is possible. Hence, a consumer i with valuation v i who purchases in both periods has (present discounted) The solution concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE here consists of the firm's strategy (composed of first-period price p 1 and second-period prices p 0 2 and p 1 2 , corresponding to the firm's two information sets in the second period 6 ); the consumers' strategies (composed of first-period purchasing decisions q i 1 and opting-out decision r i ∈ 3 The results hold when there is a finite number of consumers, provided that we add the following assumption: the firm cannot update its beliefs over how many consumers opted out based on an inventory count. Without this assumption, the firm could infer how many consumers opted out based on the inventory count. With a continuum of (massless) consumers, inventory expectations on the equilibrium path are confirmed even if a single agent deviates. 4 The qualitative nature of the results still holds under certain conditions when the cost of maintaining anonymity varies across consumers, or when it is correlated with their valuations. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that consumers incur the same cost of maintaining their anonymity. See Taylor (2004) for a model with correlated valuations, and Acquisti and Varian (2005) for a model with varying levels of consumer sophistication.
5 If the firm sets second-period prices before consumers decide on whether or not to opt out, then it can be shown that no consumer would opt out in equilibrium, for any c > 0, which is neither realistic nor interesting.
6 Technically, the strategy should also specify what the firm would have charged in the second period if it had made a different pricing decision in the first period, but we omit this for notational simplicity. We assume that p(1 − F (p)) is concave, i.e., the firm's marginal revenue in a single period game is decreasing in p (or −2f (p) − pf (p) ≤ 0); and that marginal revenue is concave (or
We denote the firm's optimal price in a one-shot version of the game by p , i.e., p = arg max p p(1 − F (p)).
Benchmarks

No recognition
First, consider as a benchmark the case where there is no consumer recognition, so that the firm cannot price discriminate in the second period between consumers that bought and did not buy in the first period. Since the firm does not price discriminate based on purchasing history, a consumer will buy the good in each period in which his valuation exceeds the price.
Thus, the firm sets the same price in each period, p = arg max p p(1 − F (p)), generating a perperiod profit of p (1−F (p ) ). Consumer surplus in each period is given by
Full recognition
Consider now the opposite extreme in which the firm is able to recognize its previous customers and consumers are unable to maintain their anonymity at any cost (as in Hart and 7 In principle, the second-period decision can also directly depend on the first-period price, but in equilibrium it will only depend on v i and p r 2 . 8 The firm will also have beliefs about what actions an anonymous agent took in the first period (did the agent purchase and opt out or not purchase at all), but this will not affect the analysis. , Schmidt (1993) , Villas-Boas (2004) , Taylor (2004) , and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) 
The cutoff typeṽ and the first-period price p 1 are determined fromṽ
and Hence, the marginal consumer who buys in the first period-the one with valuationṽ-gets no surplus in the second period. This is the ratchet effect of consumers who reveal their types (Freixas et al., 1985; Laffont and Tirole, 1988) . The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix.
Paradoxically, the full-recognition case can result in higher consumer surplus than the norecognition case, because the firm will need to set p 1 lower to attract consumers in the first period. Correspondingly, in the model with opting out, we will show that a low cost of opting out can lead to a Prisoner's Dilemma situation where consumers maintain anonymity but collectively suffer as a result, in comparison to the situation where anonymity is prohibitively costly and consumers face the ratchet effect.
By definition, a consumer with valuationṽ is indifferent between purchasing in both periods and purchasing only in the second period. It follows that the indifference condition that characterizesṽ is given byṽ
2 ) and p 1 2 =ṽ, one can simplify the firm's present discounted profit to obtaiñ
We thus have the following result.
Lemma 1. The firm's profit under full recognition is lower than its profit under no recognition.
The intuition is that some consumers refrain from purchasing in the first period because they anticipate a lower price in the next as a result, and the firm is unable to fully recoup the loss in first-period profit by price discriminating in the second period. Hart and Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) show that if the firm is able to commit to second-period prices in the first period, it would set p 1 2 = p 0 2 = p , a result which our Proposition 6 below extends to the general model where consumers can opt out. Hence, the firm's profit under commitment coincides with its profit in the no-recognition equilibrium.
Opting out and partial recognition
We now consider the setting in which consumers who purchase in the first period can opt out and preserve anonymity at a cost of c. Consumers who purchase in the first period and do not opt out are identified by the firm in the second period (the firm recognizes that they purchased at a price p 1 and did not opt out) and will be offered price p 1 2 in period 2. All other consumers are offered p 0 2 in period 2. As above, letṽ denote the lowest consumer type to purchase in the first period. We note that, given that a consumer with valuationṽ prefers to buy in the first 
and the distribution of valuations among identifiable consumers (for v ≥ṽ) is given by
where
Costless anonymity: equilibrium characterization
As a starting point, we first consider the case where c = 0. Here, we show that the equilibrium is effectively unique and corresponds to the no-recognition benchmark. , it is a best response for consumers who purchased in the first period to opt out. We now show that there is a PBE where all of them use this best response; moreover, we characterize all the PBEs in which this is the case. If all of them opt out, then all consumers are anonymous in the second period, and the firm sets p 0 2 = p to maximize period 2 profit. Moreover, given that in the second period everyone will be anonymous, only consumers with valuations v ∈ [p 1 , 1] purchase in the first period, so thatṽ = p 1 . Hence, the firm's first-period problem is to choose p 1 to maximize
Since no consumer is identified in period 2, the firm's beliefs about identified consumers' valuations are off equilibrium. Consistent off-equilibrium beliefs here are, for example, for the firm to believe identified consumers' valuations to be at leastṽ = p 1 = p , so that setting p 1 2 ≥ p is a best response. Now, suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are equilibria in which some consumers do not opt out on the path of play. For this to be the case in equilibrium, since 10 In period 2, the firm sets prices optimally to each group of consumers, and from our above observations, this has to result in p
However, the first-order condition of the firm's problem in pricing towards anonymous consumers, evaluated at p
This result says that if the cost of maintaining anonymity is nil, then it is in the best interest of every individual who purchases the good in the first period to maintain her anonymity, effectively resulting in the no-recognition outcome from Subsection 3.1. However, as indicated in Subsection 3.2, this turns out to be exactly what the firm wants.
From the perspective of consumers, in Subsection 4.4, we show that this outcome is a Prisoner's Dilemma situation: individually, each consumer chooses to maintain her anonymity; as a result, however, consumer surplus ends up being lower due to there being no price discrimination. In fact, relative to the case where anonymity is costly, every consumer ends up being (weakly) worse off overall when there is no cost associated with opting out. In other words, by opting out, consumers impose a negative externality on other consumers. Below we study how firm profit and consumer surplus are affected by the cost c of maintaining anonymity.
Costly anonymity: equilibrium characterization
We now move on to the general case in which there is some cost c ≥ 0. We will restrict our attention to PBEs in which the following holds: all consumers who purchase the good 10 We note that if f is discontinuous, then PBEs in which some consumers stay identified do exist.
in the first period opt out with the same probability α (alternatively, α can be thought of as the proportion of consumers who opt out). This restriction is motivated by the fact that all consumers who purchased in the first period face the same tradeoff when deciding to opt out: either pay p 1 2 , or pay p 0 2 + c. (In equilibrium, all first-period buyers will buy again in the second period.) We refer to such an equilibrium as a pooling equilibrium. 11 The firm's second-period beliefs over valuations in a pooling equilibrium are given by
and
In the second period, the firm chooses its prices to maximize profit according to
The following lemma shows that when c > 0, there does not exist a PBE in which all of the consumers who purchased in the first period opt out. The intuition is that when c > 0, it is optimal for the firm to lower the first-period price in order to attract more customers in the first period. For some of these customers, opting out is not a best response unless some other consumers purchase and stay identified.
Lemma 2. For c > 0, there does not exist a PBE in which all first-period customers opt out.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that there exists an equilibrium in which all consumers opt out. Since all consumers are anonymous in the second period, the seller sets p 0 2 = p . Since consumers must find opting out to be a best response, we have p 1 2 ≥ p 0 2 + c = p + c; in addition, we haveṽ ≥ p + c, else, a positive mass of consumers would not purchase in the 11 The restriction to pooling equilibria can also be justified using a purification argument. Suppose that, instead of all agents facing the same cost of opting out, each agent's opt-out cost is drawn from a commonly known distribution. Furthermore suppose these costs are drawn i.i.d. across agents, and are independent of the agent's valuation. Let d i , i ∈ N, denote a sequence of continuous distributions over the opt-out cost that an individual agent faces such that lim i→∞ d i is the degenerate distribution on c (where c is the cost in the original game G). Let G d i denote the cost-perturbed game where each consumer's cost of opting out is realized after the first-period purchasing decisions according to d i . It can be shown that the pooling equilibrium we characterize is the unique equilibrium that results from taking the limit of the equilibria of
second period and thus would not opt out. The resulting second-period profit for the firm is
The indifference condition for the cutoff typeṽ is thus given byṽ
The firm sets p 1 to maximize present-discounted profits, given by F (p ) ). The first-order condition gives
The intuition for Lemma 2 is rooted in the commitment problem of the seller. The seller is unable to directly commit not to price discriminate in the second period, but is able to influence consumers' decisions to become anonymous in the second period by raising the first-period price. However, doing so results in a loss of profit, both due to not capturing the cost consumers expend on opting out and due to lower revenues in the first period. Hence, the seller ends up choosing to set a lower first-period price and not all consumers opt out.
The next lemma provides a useful ordering of the equilibrium prices and cutoff type, and proves that anonymous consumers pay a discounted price in the second period. The key drivers for the result are the seller's inability to commit to second-period prices and consumers' strategic prediction of future prices in the first period. (1) and (2). vf (v) , the cutoff typeṽ and opting out probability α are determined from: A consumer with valuationṽ will be indifferent among only buying in the first period, only buying in the second period, and buying in both periods. A consumer with valuation at most v will not purchase in the first period, and purchase in the second period if and only if her valuation is at leastṽ − c. Essentially, the firm offers anonymous customers "introductory" prices in each period (though the introductory price is more attractive in the second period).
We now move on to general values of c (not necessarily small). Let α(c) denote the probability that a consumer who purchased in the first period maintains anonymity, when the cost of doing so is c. (In a pooling equilibrium, by definition, this probability is the same for all agents who purchase in the first period.) Also let p 1,F R 2 and p 0,F R 2 denote the second period full-recognition benchmark prices, and finally letc = p
We proceed with several lemmas that address higher level of costs, which we then integrate to give a more general characterization of equilibrium. The first lemma addresses the case where the cost of opting out is high.
Lemma 4. For c ≥c, the outcome from any pooling equilibrium coincides with the full-recognition benchmark outcome.
The intuition for this result is the following. For high costs of opting out, the full-recognition benchmark outcome is obtainable by the firm. In fact, the firm's problem is a constrained version of its counterpart in the full-recognition benchmark, where its optimal strategy and corresponding outcome in the latter is feasible. In essence, since the cost of opting out is high, the availability of opting out does little to help the firm's profit in terms of encouraging more consumers to purchase in the first period, but more to hurt the firm's profit by failing to capture a significant part of the cost anonymizing consumers incur. Consequently, the firm sets prices that encourage consumers to stay identified in equilibrium.
The next lemma addresses the region of cost where consumers no longer opt out.
Lemma 5. Letĉ denote the smallest cost such that α(ĉ) = 0. Thenĉ <c.
The intuition for Lemma 5 relates to that of Lemma 4. In particular, the firm works to mitigate its loss of potential profit from consumers anonymizing by reducing consumers' incentive to opt out. According to Lemma 5, the firm begins to do so for costs smaller thanc.
The following Lemma shows that indeed no consumer opts out in equilibrium for all c ≥ĉ.
The intuition for this result is that the firm maintains the status quo in terms of opting out once it is able to eliminate consumers' incentives to do so atĉ. The firm achieves this by setting a first-period price that is sufficiently low (with a corresponding cutoff typeṽ that is also sufficiently low). 
For c = 0, the unique pooling equilibrium outcome coincides with the no-recognition equilibrium outcome and is characterized by Proposition 2.
For c ∈ (0,ĉ], the unique pooling equilibrium outcome is characterized by Proposition 3.
For c ∈ (ĉ,c), letv be defined by F (v − c) + (v − c)f (v − c) = F (v). Thenṽ is nondecreasing in c on this region, withṽ(ĉ) <ṽ(c), and maximizesṽ(1 − F (ṽ))(
1 + δ) + δp 0 2 (F (ṽ) − F (p 0 2 )), subject toṽ ≤v, F (p 0 2 ) + f (p 0 2 )p
For c ≥c, the outcome from any pooling equilibrium coincides with the full-recognition benchmark outcome.
Figure 2 shows how the probability of opting out is affected by the cost of maintaining anonymity, c. The region [ĉ,c] is of particular interest: as we will show shortly, consumer and social surplus (weakly) decrease in this region, the firm's profit (weakly) increases, but the probability of opting out is fixed at 0. The various regions can be explained as follows. First, the firm loses profit when consumers opt out. When a consumer chooses to opt out, because the firm's second-period price for anonymous consumers is c lower than for identified consumers (to keep consumers indifferent between opting out and staying identified), this effectively costs the firm c. That is, the cost of opting out is passed on to the firm. Second, since some consumers opt out, the second-period price to anonymous consumers, p 0 2 , targets both first-time buyers and repeat customers who opted out. Hence, (anonymous) repeat customers are interfering with the firm's ability to capture more first-time buyers in the second period, lowering the firm's profit. On the other hand, because consumers can opt out, more consumers decide to buy in the first period, which helps the firm's profit. This latter effect dominates when c is low, but is overcome by the former two effects as c grows larger -to the point (at c =ĉ) where it pays off for the firm to lower the first price sufficiently so that no consumer opts out. Once the cost reachesĉ, nobody will opt out, allowing the firm to more easily price-discriminate as c increases.
The next proposition addresses the interval of opting out cost [ĉ,c] as it pertains to welfare. Recall thatĉ is defined as the smallest cost such that the purchasing consumers' probability of opting out is 0 (i.e., the smallest c such that α(c) = 0);c is defined as the difference in second-period prices in the full-recognition benchmark. [ĉ,c] and is strictly higher for c ≥c than atĉ. Consumer and social surplus are non-increasing over [ĉ,c] and are strictly lower at c ≥c than atĉ.
Proposition 5. The firm's profit is non-decreasing in c over
This result is striking for two reasons. First, it leads to the observation that the firm's profit is non-monotonic in the cost of opting out, as we illustrate in the following subsection.
Second, it shows that consumers can actually be worse off as the cost of opting out increases.
In other words, facilitating opting out can actually improve consumers' welfare. This finding extends the previous literature, which finds that strategic consumers are better off under fullrecognition compared to no-recognition. The above result brings forth the observation that although consumers may not opt out in some region of cost (i.e., full recognition takes place), they could still be better off when opting out is more accessible, even if they choose not to opt out. Said another way, there are different shades of "full recognition," and as far as consumers (and overall welfare) are concerned, some are better than others -namely the ones where opting out is more accessible. We further illustrate this finding in Subsection 4.4.
Firm profit
For c ∈ [0,ĉ] and for c =c, the firm's present-discounted profit is given by
By Proposition 5, the firm's profit for c ∈ (ĉ,c) is lower than at c =c. 12 At c = 0, the firm obtains the no-recognition benchmark profit (where all consumers opt out), given by (1 + δ)p (1 − F (p )). Lemma 1 showed that this profit exceeds the one in the full-recognition benchmark (with no opting out). Consequently, it is also greater than the firm's profit for any opting out cost c ∈ (ĉ,c).
The above indicates that the firm's profit is non-monotonic in the cost of opting out: It is higher at c = 0 than at eitherĉ orc, but lower atĉ than atc. We also recall that in the full-recognition benchmark, if the firm is able to commit, then the outcome coincides with the no-recognition benchmark. It turns out that this remains true in the model with (costly) opting out. The following proposition proves this and summarizes the above observations.
Proposition 6 (Firm profit). The firm's profit is highest at c = 0 and is non-monotonic in c. If the firm is able to commit to second-period prices in the first period, the firm would set p
Proof: For a given cost of opting out, c, the firm's profit cannot exceed its profit when it collects this c from consumers who opt out (this is a hypothetical situation). This profit is found by adding δα(c)c(1 − F (ṽ)) (the present-discounted amount consumers spend on opting out) to 12 We note that for all c ≥c, the firm obtains the full-recognition equilibrium profit. the firm's profit in (6). Then, an upper bound on the firm's profit is given by: 13
The expression in (7) Proof: Suppose on the contrary that some mass of consumers opts out in equilibrium when the firm commits to second-period prices. For opting out to benefit some consumers, we have 
Do consumers benefit from more privacy?
We now turn to consumer surplus. Proposition 6 shows that the firm obtains its highest profit when consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity. However, this does not immediately imply that consumer surplus is at its lowest in this case, because the total surplus may vary depending on the cost of opting out. Specifically, since there is no cost to production, the efficient outcome in this model -the first best -would be for every consumer to obtain the good in each period. Hence, the efficient outcome is not obtained for any c ≥ 0, since some consumers do not purchase.
For c ∈ [0,ĉ] and c ≥c, consumer surplus is given by 14
In (8) 
The firm sets the first-period price
Second-period prices satisfy p Figure 3 , we also study social surplus, which can be interpreted in two different ways, depending on whether the cost of opting out is deadweight loss, or collected as a fee by a third party (for example, one can rent an anonymous postal box for a fee). In the former case, social surplus equals firm profit plus consumer surplus; in the latter, social surplus is higher than this sum if consumers opt out at positive costs.
Proposition 7. With uniformly distributed valuations, the following properties are satisfied:
• Consumer surplus is non-monotonic in c, increasing in c over [0,ĉ), decreasing over [ĉ,c), higher for c ≥ĉ than at c = 0, and highest atĉ. c) , and highest at c = 0. • When the cost of opting out is not wasted, social surplus is non-monotonic in c, increasing in c over [0,ĉ), decreasing over [ĉ,c) , higher for c ≥ĉ than at c = 0, and highest atĉ.
• The firm's profit is non-monotonic in c, decreasing in c over
[0, 1+δ 4+5δ ), increasing over [ 1+δ 4+5δ ,
• When the cost of opting out is deadweight loss, social surplus is non-monotonic in c, decreasing in c over
The intuition is as follows: when c = 0, all consumers who purchase in the first period choose to maintain their anonymity. As c begins to rise, consumers must pay a non-trivial cost in order to opt out. The firm resorts to reducing the first-period price to counteract the negative effect on consumers' buying incentives: consumers are reluctant to purchase in the first period because of the cost they will incur in the second period either from opting out or from paying a high price. This results in a lower profit for the firm than it would have had with a lower c, but in higher consumer surplus. In the case where c is deadweight loss, this also results in lower social surplus because many consumers opt out in this region of cost.
As c approachesĉ, fewer consumers opt out. This gives the firm more flexibility in setting second-period prices, allowing it to better price discriminate which leads to a slight increase in profit. The firm continues to depress the first-period price over this range; additionally, better price discrimination allows the firm to target more low valuation consumers in the second period. This results in higher consumer surplus. Hence, as c approachesĉ, both profit and consumer surplus are increasing so that social surplus is increasing when the cost c is wasted. When it is not wasted, social surplus is increasing but not as steeply because there is no surplus recovered directly from fewer consumers anonymizing (we recall that in this case, social surplus equals the sum of profit, consumer surplus, and the total cost of opting out).
When c is in [ĉ,c] , no consumer opts out. The firm increases prices in this range in order to better price discriminate in the second period, which results in fewer consumers purchasing and lower surplus overall.
The following proposition addresses the surplus of an individual consumer when valuations are uniformly distributed, after the consumer learns her valuation for the good. (ii) We now consider a consumer i with valuation v i ∈ [p ,ṽ] . For a given c > 0, i will only consider purchasing in the second period. When doing so, her surplus is given by δ( individually, each consumer chooses to maintain her anonymity; however, every consumer ends up being (weakly) worse off as as a result of there being no price discrimination. The reason is that by opting out, consumers impose a negative externality on other consumers; a non-zero cost of opting out serves to at least partially alleviate this effect by diminishing the incentive to opt out.
Conclusions and extensions
We studied a model in which a firm is able to recognize and price discriminate against its previous customers, while consumers can maintain their anonymity at some cost. We showed that the firm obtains its highest profit when consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity, but consumers can be better off when maintaining anonymity is costly, though only up to a point. This paper suggests that certain aspects of online consumer privacy may be misjudged by policymakers and consumer advocacy groups. In particular, facilitating opting out can decrease consumer and social surplus when the cost of opting out is already low, although the opposite (or a neutral) effect takes place at higher costs. Of course, in practice, many other considerations need to be taken into account that are not in the scope of our model, such as the intrinsic value of privacy, as well as the (possibly accidental) release of sensitive information and corresponding spillover effects-for example, the release of an individual's medical records to her employer.
Our model can, in principle, be extended to take certain other economic considerations into account. An obvious direction is to study a setting with competition. Indeed, we have some initial findings in a similar model with two firms selling differentiated products; these findings suggest that phenomena similar to those identified above continue to occur. Another direction for further study is to make the cost of opting out endogenous. For example, one can consider a setting where a third party-a privacy gatekeeper-can provide anonymity to consumers for a fee. 15 One of our preliminary findings in this extension of the model is that the privacy gatekeeper would prefer to bargain with the firm and actually set the cost to consumers of opting out to zero. One can also consider settings where consumers obtain some benefit from being identified, such as smaller search costs or better technical support. Our preliminary finding here is that the results from the basic model carry through, except the relevant range of costs grows larger. 16 Another variant is to consider an opt-in policy. For instance, the firm could pay consumers to be identified (as in the case of membership programs that offer discounts). Another direction is to increase consumer heterogeneity by, for instance, allowing each consumer to have a different cost for opting out. One can also enrich the model by studying consumers with diminishing marginal utility for future units of the product. Finally, it would be interesting to study the steady-state equilibrium of an infinite-horizon version of our model with overlapping generations of consumers.
There are, in fact, a multitude of questions concerning issues of online privacy that are both interesting and potentially important. A primary message of this paper is that the answers to such questions may not be as obvious as they first appear. Indeed -as we have illustratedit is often necessary to parse carefully the underlying economic forces at work before one can make correct policy recommendations.
B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Proof: Letṽ denote the cutoff type of the marginal consumer who purchases in the first period, and assume thatṽ ≥ p . We will show that this is indeed satisfied on the path of play in equilibrium.
The firm's second-period problems towards identified and anonymous consumers are given by p 
The firm's first-period problem is given by choosing p 1 to maximize
whereṽ is a function of p 1 , p 1 2 and p 0 2 are functions ofṽ (and thus of p 1 ). An alternative approach that is technically simpler is for the firm's to chooseṽ to maximize (12), treating p 1 as a function ofṽ instead. Simplifying (12) using p 1 2 =ṽ, the firm's problem is then given by settingṽ to maximize
The first-order condition gives
Assume on the contrary thatṽ ≤ p .
f (ṽ) forṽ < p , it follows from (13) 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Assumeṽ ≥ p holds on the path of play. By Lemma 2, p 1 2 = max{p ,ṽ} =ṽ. (We show below thatṽ ≥ p is indeed satisfied.) From Lemma 3, the solution to the firm's period 2 problem for anonymous consumers satisfies the first-order condition of (3):
If α > 0, in order for consumers who mix between opting out and not opting out to be indif- 
Substituting using h (v) = F (v) + vf (v) in the above, we immediately obtain (5).
From p 1 2 = p 0 2 +c =ṽ, it follows that a consumer with valuationṽ obtains a payoff of zero in period 2. Moreover, since a consumer with valuationṽ is indifferent between purchasing now and possibly later and purchasing only later, she is overall indifferent between purchasing only now, purchasing only later, and purchasing now and later (with and without opting out). Since this consumer receives zero payoff in period 2, the following equality holds:ṽ −p 1 = δ(ṽ −p 0 2 ), i.e., the consumer is indifferent between purchasing only in the first period and only in the second period. Substituting using p 0 2 =ṽ − c, we obtainṽ = p 1 + δc. Hence, ifṽ ≥ p , the firm's first-period problem of choosing p 1 is equivalent to choosingṽ such that p 1 =ṽ−δc and p 0 2 =ṽ − c. The firm's first-period problem is to choose p 1 to maximize its present-discounted profit:
Using the above observations, the firm's first-period problem is reduced to
Substituting for α using (15) in the above, we obtain
Rearranging (17), we obtain
Given a sufficiently small c, (18) can be used to solve forṽ (we recall δ > 0 is assumed throughout).
To show thatṽ ≥ p is indeed satisfied, substituteṽ = p into (17). Using the fact that
it is easy to see that this expression equals 0 when c = 0, since h(p ) = 1. Differentiating this expression with respect to c gives
and f (p ) > 0, this derivative is positive. Hence, the first-order condition in (18) evaluated at v = p is nonnegative and strictly positive for c > 0. It follows thatṽ ≥ p .
Rearranging (18) gives
By assumption, v(1 − F (v)) and its derivative are concave. It follows that the left-hand side of (19) is decreasing inṽ while the right-hand side is increasing. Hence, a uniqueṽ satisfies the first-order condition, giving a unique behavior in a pooling equilibrium on the path of play.
The firm's problem is defined over a compact interval, where profit is not maximized at neither boundaryṽ = 0 norṽ = 1. Moreover, the firm's first and second-period problems are well defined givenṽ ≥ p and the solution to the firm's problem indeed satisfiesṽ ≥ p . It follows that a pooling equilibrium exists.
We note that equilibrium behavior off the path of play has not been specified. In the first period, for instance, if the firm sets p 1 = 0, there exists an equilibrium of the continuation game in which all consumers buy. If no consumer opts out, the firm does not learn anything about identified consumers. In this case, the firm sets p An analogous argument can be made for any c >c. It follows that for any c ≥c, the pooling equilibrium outcome coincides with the full-recognition benchmark outcome. 17 There are off-path situations in which consumers behave in a non-utility maximizing way, but such individual behavior does not affect the prices offered by the firm nor the firm's beliefs. Similarly, off-path situations following p 1 = 1 (no consumer purchases in the first period) or p 1 = 0 (all consumers purchase in the first period) are obvious. These prices cannot be sustained in equilibrium: the firm possesses profitable deviations in the first period by setting p 1 ∈ (0, 1), strictly increasing its first-period profit, while it is still able to obtain the same second-period profit by setting p
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: From Lemma 4, it immediately follows that there existsĉ ∈ (0,c] such that α(ĉ) = 0.
Sinceĉ is the smallest cost at which no consumer opts out, the first-order condition (henceforth FOC) of the firm's first-period problem (4) is satisfied atĉ. We can then apply Proposition
From α(ĉ) = 0, we have (where we henceforth useṽ in leu ofṽ(c) to simplify expressions)
Deriving (20) with respect toṽ and simplifying using (21), we have:
We recall from (18) the (expanded) FOC of the firm's first-period problem:
Using (21) and simplifying, the above evaluated atĉ reduces to:
where −f (ṽ) + f (ṽ) was added as a wash. We can now simplify further using (22) to obtaiñ
We now compare (23) with the corresponding FOC in the full-recognition benchmark to illustrate the relationship betweenĉ andc. The firm's FOC in the full-recognition benchmark gives
Since the price p For the sake of contradiction, assume thatĉ =c. Thenṽ(ĉ) =ṽ F R follows from Lemma 4.
For (23) and (24) 
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: From (23), the firm's FOC atĉ gives
where α = ∂α/∂ṽ. From (22), we also have
Substituting α into the above FOC and simplifying, we have
For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists some k ∈ (ĉ,c) such that α(k ) > 0.
Since α(c) = 0, there must exist k > k such that α(k) = 0 and the first-order condition (27) is satisfied at c = k (i.e., α turns 0 at k and Proposition 3 can be applied). From Proposition 3, we also have p 0 2 (k) =ṽ(k) − k. Substituting this into the firm's second-period problem, we obtain
Due to concavity of p(1 − F (p)), the latter expression together with (28) Since α(k) = 0, the first-order condition at k similarly gives:
To see that this expression is negative, we first note that ( ) is lower (more negative) than its corresponding term in (27). In addition, the hazard rate 
Letv(c) satisfy
From ( 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: Following the proof of part (4) 
